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Abstract 
This working paper studies the Euro-Algerian relationship through the lens of investment in human 
capital and looks at how European interventions encourage the transformation of Algerian 
governmentality. In addition to the various policies implemented since the signing of the Association 
agreement in 2002, the article also interrogates the agendas of local institutions and actors who support 
or resist this transformative influence. After an introductory section that presents the concept of human 
capital and its relevance for the Euro-Algerian context, the following sections show how the Euro-
Algerian cooperation draws on technologies of standardization, securitization and responsibilization in 
order to shape a socially integrated, politically and economically moral subject. This empirical 
analysis serves to understand the ordoliberal character of this intervention. Indeed, the goal of the 
European Union is not merely to propose a technical intervention in order to promote a stable 
environment for the modernization of the economy. Instead, the shaping of Algeria's human resources, 
with the support of diverse segments of the ruling elite, shows the depth of a restructuring that is also 
political. The relationship between the nation-state and its population is thus affected, as the former is 
associated with an anthropological process that must foster both economic efficiency and civic 
awareness.  
Keywords: 
Algeria, Cooperation, European Neighborhood, Ordoliberalism, Governmentality  
 
 1 
Introduction* 
The influence of the European Union (EU) on Mediterranean countries has been widely discussed 
since the Arab uprisings of 2010-2011. The Maghreb is often portrayed as a region that requires 
intervention in order to foster regional integration and to stabilize a new political economy (Biad 
2013; Escribano 2016). European intervention in the South promotes both normative models and self 
interest, which are sometime expressed through the same concept, such as the free market economy. 
Consequently, the EU has been presented as a “normative empire,” a notion that bridges the divide 
between normative and interest-based actions and is especially useful in studying the EU's influence in 
economic matters (Del Sarto 2016). Despite the widespread use of techno-managerial practices, 
European involvement in the economic restructuring of its Mediterranean neighbors is far from being 
a neutral process. As recently shown in the Egyptian case, these interventions result in local and 
international competition, tensions and rejections (Roccu 2015). In order to better understand these 
dynamics, this working paper studies the Euro-Algerian relationship through the lens of investment in 
human capital. 
This paper draws on Algerian newspapers, European and Algerian think tanks and documents 
produced by institutions associated with the European Neighborhood Policy
1
, to look at how European 
interventions encourage the transformation of Algerian governmentality. By governmentality, we refer 
to a fragmented form of power that targets the population, and relies on political economy and security 
technologies (Foucault 2004a). Framed by the Association Agreement signed in 2002, the Euro-
Algerian cooperation implements several programs aimed at transforming the local population, 
employees and civil servants in accordance with the needs of a modern economy and the polity. This 
paper examines the ordoliberal character of this undertaking. It also analyzes the changing forms of 
governmentality in Algeria, the strategies of the EU as well as the reactions of local actors to these 
transformations. 
The first part of this paper introduces the concept of human capital and its relevance in the Euro-
Algerian context. It allows us to highlight the ordoliberal genealogy associated with projects of social 
engineering in Europe. Given the fact that the EU's “external governance” is differentiated in its forms 
and largely depends on domestic structures (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009), this introductory 
section also presents the debates and actors associated with the notion of human capital in Algeria. 
The second section studies the ways in which cooperation programs aim at empowering and 
responsibilizing the population. Here, we notably investigate attempts to raise the environmental 
awareness of local actors. Following, the third part of this working paper focuses on the technologies 
of securitization associated with Euro-Algerian cooperation, which are viewed as a way to promote 
stable environment for the modernization of the economy. From this perspective, we look at programs 
that target “at-risk” populations, such as the unemployed youth. Finally, the fourth and last section 
investigates the EU's involvement in the standardization of Algeria's “human resources” by examining 
the trainings provided to local private companies and the reform of higher education. Overall, the 
paper show that these transformations of local governmentality aims at shaping a particular ordoliberal 
subject. 
                                                     
*
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1. Human Capital in a Euro-Algerian Perspective 
1.1 Human Capital, Development and European Ordoliberalism 
The notion of human capital was theorized after WWII by neoclassical economists such as Gary 
Becker (1964), who proposed an understanding of the concept based on individual rationality. In the 
late 1980s, a greater emphasis was placed upon society, both as a collective actor and a beneficiary of 
the development of individual skills. As neoclassical economic theory started to account for the 
influence of governmental spending, human capital became a matter of public policy. This evolution 
came with an important paradigm change in the way economic development was conceptualized. This 
shift was at the core of the Washington consensus, a term that coined the establishment of a set of 
prescriptions for the economic restructuring of indebted countries. An important feature in these 
prescriptions was the development of human capital in a market-friendly environment in order to 
“enable individuals to plug themselves into the world economy” (Williamson 1996: 20). This resulted 
in the adoption of a newly hegemonic paradigm by international organizations. For instance, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) funded its own “human capital 
project” in order to provide policy-makers with quantitative tools and comparative statistical data.2 
The importance given to the notion of human capital in development policies has been criticized. 
One of the most common critiques of this concept denounces the commodification of labor-power and 
the reduction of individuals to a quantifiable human resource (Holborow 2015). More broadly, so-
called “post-development” approaches present development economics as a set of technologies of 
power that objectifies target countries and subjects individuals to a techno-economic rational (Escobar 
1995). These critiques echo Foucault's discussion of “human capital” as a key feature in the “extension 
of economic analysis” to a new realm in order to reconfigure state policies (2004b: 215-233). These 
critiques were answered by the formulation of a human development theory. Merging post-
development critique and human capital, it proposed a theoretical frame that emphasized social justice, 
economic growth, environmental concerns and individual capabilities (Sen 1999). Nevertheless, 
despite the incorporation of pro-welfare policies, approaches based on human capital echoed a 
neoliberal narrative that focuses on individual responsibility and entrepreneurial behavior (Ferguson 
2009: 176-177). 
From a European perspective, the notion of human capital can be situated in a longstanding 
tradition of social engineering in order to create a common market and to foster integration (Addison 
& Siebert 1993). Top-down interventions aiming at transforming social and economic structures were 
at the core of the early Common Agricultural Policy, as the contentious Mansholt plan proposed a 
radical transformation of the European peasantry drawing on trainings and helps to reconversion 
(Bourrigaud 2013). Contemporary EU policies continue to merge economic and social goals. Thus, the 
promotion of gender equality in public policies also serves to foster social progress and fair 
competition in labor markets (Jacquot 2006). These interventions reveal the specificity of European 
“neoliberalism,” which – as Foucault suggested - is indebted to the influence of German 
ordoliberalism. A specific subset in the broader neoliberal spectrum, ordoliberalism draws on the 
technicization of monetary politics, budgetary equilibrium, rule of law and ordered competition in the 
frame of a “social market economy” (Pessin & Strassel 2006). The ordoliberal state must be strong 
because it is in charge of ordering freedom, as public interventions shape the behavior of individuals 
and companies (Bonefeld 2012). Moreover, ordoliberalism views the ideal subject as not only a 
rational economic agent but also a citizen who is responsible for the polity. 
While still drawing on ordoliberal principles, European governmentality has evolved from a high-
modern style -based on top-down policies- to a post-modern style -based on a fragmented governance. 
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This evolution implied the enlargement of the decision-making process, the diminution of the 
economic relevance of the nation-state and the increased relevance of the market both as a tool and an 
objective (Walters & Haahr 2005: 58-63). As we will see with the Algerian case, the switch from 
high-modernism to post-modernism is far from being definitive. In addition, this evolution does not 
invalidate the ordoliberal demand for a strong public involvement to order the market. Thus, the 
economic weight of public sector remained more important in Europe than in other OECD countries, a 
difference that was praised by the European Commission in 2005.
3
 
1.2 Managing Human Resources in the Mediterranean Space 
The EU appropriated the concept of human capital in the 1990s. The investment in human resources 
was mentioned explicitly in the Maastricht Treaty as a way to shape the new supranational entity.
4
 As 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) has sometimes been criticized for blurring the limits between 
intra-European and extra-European development (Hachez & Wouters 2013: 297), its activities allow 
us to understand how a European focus on human capital has permeated the Mediterranean space. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, the EIB focused its actions in the South on sectors of transportation, 
industry, energy and the environment. After the European councils of Amsterdam (1997) and Cologne 
(1999), the Bank was given the ability to finance projects in the sectors of education and health in 
Europe in order to “promote and preserve human capital.”5 This evolution was soon extended to the 
periphery, with the creation of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership 
(FEMIP) in 2002. According to the EIB, social investment (in health and education) was now 
necessary to ensure the stability of the region.
6
 As the question of the human capital became central 
beyond the European frontiers, one can see how the single market's rationality extended beyond the 
limits of the economic space. 
This focus on human capital also expresses a desire to manage flows of labor-force, as migration is 
understood as an investment both for the individuals, the private sector and the authorities (Foucault 
2004b: 230). In a recent study conducted by the Parliament's Directorate-General for External Policies, 
the EU's action in favor of human capital in the Mediterranean was described as including a range of 
initiatives “favoring the qualification of peoples” in association with private companies.7 The related 
process of commodification is obvious in the discussion of the positive and negative “externalities” 
associated to the “circulation of human capital” proposed in a working paper for the Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
8 
At the same time, the hostility regarding migrations 
from the South remains patent, notably in the name of cultural differences, and results in the framing 
of this issue as a matter of security (Gabrielli, 2014). The joint commodification and securitization of 
human flows serves to create a space of qualification and disqualification. The related geography of 
mobility and exclusion underlines the geopolitical tensions in the Mediterranean. 
These tensions are also related to the colonial genealogy that has characterized European 
development policies (Davis 2016; Dimier 2003). This historical legacy fuels a resistance in the South, 
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especially in a country such as Algeria, where the rejection of dependence and foreign interference 
remains especially strong. Consequently, the management of human resources in the Mediterranean 
space occurs within a broader context of mistrust. The construction of a free-trade zone illustrates 
these difficulties. At the beginning of the new millennium, the EIB estimated that the free-trade zone 
in the Euro-Mediterranean space would be completed around 2010.
9
 A few years later, the Association 
Agreement between the EU and Algeria stated that the free movement of goods and capital would be 
effective within a period of 12 years (2017).
10
 But these predictions were again overly optimistic, and 
the Algerian government soon concluded that the agreement should be renegotiated and the 
establishment of a free-trade zone was pushed back to 2020. In order to understand this series of 
frustrations, we should look not only at the goals and visions of the EU, but also at the agency 
of local actors. 
1.3 Algerian Perspectives 
The project of transforming the Algerian population has its own local history. After the war of 
Independence, the revolutionary elite viewed the investment in the education of the masses as a 
condition sine qua non for the construction of a modern national identity (Lacheraf 2006: 273-302). 
Human development was to ensure class emancipation and bolster the socialist orientation of the 
Revolution. Moreover, the economic reforms implemented in the 1960s sought to erase traditional 
solidarities and create modern consumers (Redjimi 2001). These policies were implemented in the 
framework of a centralized governmentality, as the Algerian government aimed to transform its 
population by relying on planning – a strategy adopted by many other developing countries from 
Egypt to India. In Bouteflika's Algeria, the state remains the primary force that manages the economy 
and the society, by relying on its hydrocarbon rent. Key actors in the ruling coalition are agents of the 
state (army officers, technocrats) and their domination is dependent on this top-down configuration. 
This explains their reluctance to accept a full economic liberalization that would threaten their ability 
to manage both the economy and the society. 
Yet since the end of the 1980s, Algeria has progressively abandoned its “specific socialism”, and 
the ruling coalition has become increasingly heterogeneous. The rise of a liberal rhetoric is obvious 
when it comes to transforming popular behaviors, both from a political and economic point of view. 
Rather than speaking of raising class awareness or creating a national culture of emancipation, 
Algerian officials now speak the language of democracy and human capital. For example, during the 
United Nations' conference hosted by Algeria in 2003, the influential Minister of Investment, 
Abdelhamid Temmar, quoted Gary Becker before explaining that democracy was an “extremely 
important element for human resources.” He went on to analyze the fall of communism and its link 
with human capital and to argue in favor of the development of “creativity” and “managerial 
capacity.”11
 
Changes in Algerian governmentality also imply that crony capitalists have become 
privileged interlocutors of the government regarding economic policies. A prominent figure such as 
Ali Haddad illustrates the double commitment of Algerian businessmen toward economic change and 
political status quo (Boubekeur 2013). The CEO of the construction company ETRHB is one of 
Bouteflika's most active supporters. At end of 2014, he became the head of the business owners' union 
(Forum des Chefs d'Entreprise – FCE). As such, he asked for structural reforms and an increased role 
for private companies in the development of human capital.
12
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The question of economic reform is now at the nexus of contradictory agendas, from the efforts of 
state elites to preserve a centralized governmentality to attempts by crony capitalist to intervene in the 
decision-making process. In their attempt to reshape Algeria’s political economy, successive 
governments have also opened a space for reformist claims. Many of these critiques are expressed by 
activists, trade unions and political parties situated at the left of the political field. The dominant 
egalitarian culture is translated in denunciations of the spoliation of national wealth and social 
injustice that are echoed by private newspapers (El Khabar, El Watan, Liberté...). At the same time, 
while these organizations defend the socialist legacy of the Revolution, other groups advocate for a 
liberal reform of the polity and the economy. Among these actors, one can find entrepreneurs, 
journalists and economists who are often privileged interlocutors of foreign partners. 
The think tank Nabni exemplifies the growing visibility of pro-business reformists in Algerian 
debates. While some of its prominent members are related to international finance, such as Lies 
Kerrar,
13
 its spokesman Abdelkrim Boudra is the head of a company specialized in professional 
training based in Algiers. Both Kerrar and Boudra have also worked with state institutions, such as the 
national tax council and the national agency for the development of small businesses. These actors, 
situated at the crossroads of state and business interests, critique and support, policy-making and 
consulting, embody the contradictory dynamics that are transforming Algerian governmentality. In 
2013, the report published by Nabni provoked extensive commentary in the press and democratic 
circles.
14
 The authors insisted on questions of education and health and claimed that human capital 
should represent a priority for public investment in order to improve the country's competitiveness. 
While giving suggestions for Algeria to adapt to the global economy, they also underlined the 
necessity of support for low-income housings. This report illustrated the ways in which an ordoliberal 
discourse on human capital and social spending can be welcomed in a political context marked by a 
strong egalitarian culture. According to its authors, the financial power of the state was to be used to 
improve the economic environment, for the benefit of the people. 
Nevertheless, in times of budgetary scarcity, the social dimension of ordoliberalism tends to vanish. 
In 2015, following the fall of hydrocarbon prices, Nabni published an emergency plan in which the 
investment in human capital was no longer mentioned. The think tank proposed a program that 
focused on the re-establishment of a balanced budget, the implementation of investment-friendly 
economic reforms, the strengthening of the rule of law, and a style of governance based on a strict 
evaluation of performance.
15
 The authors also argued that some unpopular decisions should be made, 
including the progressive end of subventions for goods and services. This ordoliberal diet focused on 
the reform of the state rather than on social engineering. Finally, one can see here that the promotion 
of an ordoliberal agenda in Algeria is not merely an external imposition, despite local resistances. 
Many actors in the government, in the economic field, in think thanks or even in the academic system, 
are associated with this process. Thus, they often provide expertise and support in order to orient the 
European intervention. 
2. Responsibilization 
2.1 Changing the Regime and the Masses 
European interventions in Algeria can be divided into two categories. On one hand, the cooperation 
implies a direct partnership with public institutions to improve the “quality of governance.” This meets 
the demands of the Algerian government that favors a cooperation based on transfers of knowledge 
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and seeks assistance in the implementation of reforms.
16
 To reinforce the Algerian state's capability, 
the EU draws on the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange program (TAIEX). Algeria's 
involvement with TAIEX has constantly increased since 2009; in the last six years, more than 2000 
individuals have participated in their training programs.
17
 In this case, investment in human capital 
aims at enhancing state capabilities and standardizing public practices in accordance with globalized 
norms. The second form of intervention is based on programs directed at different segments of 
Algerian society in order to improve the individual and collective capabilities. These programs notably 
draw on and support non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), which conduct training programs and benefit from the enhancement of their employees' 
skills. In the next three sections, we will study the ways in which the EU tries to change Algeria's 
human capital, from the education of concerned citizens to the promotion of an entrepreneurial spirit. 
Many technologies of power that are characteristic of European governmentality seek to shape 
citizens in accordance with ideal moral, economic and political skills (Walters & Haahr 2005: 75-76). 
Coherent with the paradigm of capability that has become central to transnational development 
policies, these technologies enhance the individual’s ability to act as an autonomous subject and 
concerned citizen. This top-down approach, which seeks to improve the behavior of the population, 
appears as a technology of responsibilization (Lemke 2001). The fact that this responsibilization is 
both economic and political is a key feature of ordoliberalism. Moreover, the targeting of public 
servants echoes the ordoliberal focus on the strengthening of the state. 
When offered opportunities for self-improvement, subjects are held singularly responsible for their 
persistently “uncivil” behavior or their inability to adapt to new economic conditions. Here, one can 
recognize a central assumption of human capital theory: individuals are supposed to act rationally to 
maximize their benefits. As such, this approach tends to isolate the individual from his or her social, 
political and economic environment (Block 1990: 25). For example, according to the Algerian press 
and various experts on both sides of the Mediterranean, the capacity of Algerian peasants to export 
their crops on the European market depends on their ability to adapt to European norms and 
techniques, which implies the evolution of local mentalities.
18
 Consequently, DIVECO, the program 
aiming at diversifying the Algerian economy and favoring exports, provided hundreds of public 
servants, engineers, local officials and farmer representatives with trainings aiming at similar 
objectives.
19
 The ambiguity of any technology of responsibilization is that it provides local actors with 
tools to act by themselves, while ignoring the global structures that impact their choices and the results 
of the investment. In short, this discourse centered on subjects rather than structures, overlooks the fact 
that the ability of Algerian farmers to export to the European market will also be considerably 
impacted by elements beyond their control, such as speculation or European protectionism. 
In the neoliberal era, it often seems that the deficiencies of the developmental state can be 
compensated through an increased involvement of local “civil society” (Ferguson 2006). In the 
Algerian case, the problem of corruption is especially telling. The issue is constantly underlined by 
reports and statistics produced by the European Commission, where it is presented as a consequence of 
economic liberalization, the weakness of the rule of law, and the lack of political will of the 
government.
20
 In this context, a survey ordered by the EU illustrates the shared belief that the most 
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important duty of Algerian “civil society” organizations is to fight corruption.21 Yet, as the question is 
limited to its national dimension, its global causes remain unaddressed; one might cite, for example, 
the responsibility of European companies and fiscal paradises in widespread corruption and 
embezzlement in African countries. Rather, the responsibilization of local actors allows for 
increasingly culturalist explanations, as the Algerian press often insists on the necessity to change the 
mentalities via education in order to cure the “disease of corruption.”22 
The need to transform the masses is inseparable from the need to improve the “quality of 
governance” in Algeria. For many years, liberal critiques have maintained that any comprehensive 
reform must start by changing the people. A former liberal minister, now critical of the regime and an 
occasional participant in Nabni's conferences, Noureddine Boukrouh, has been especially active in 
promoting the idea that Algeria can only be reformed by changing both the masses and the regime 
(2013). The question of Algeria's human capital remains intrinsically linked to a postcolonial 
configuration, where culturalist narratives turn Escobar's “defensive localization” (2001: 149) on its 
head, in order to explain a difficult political and economic situation. As the place of the nation-state is 
threatened by transnational economic dynamics, national culture is held responsible for the lack of 
competitiveness. As a counterpoint, while the European model is not praised unanimously, both due to 
historical reasons and its concrete performance, it remains pertinent when it comes to specific domains 
related to human capital, such as rural development or higher education.
23
 
2.2 Making Responsible Citizens 
The EU is especially committed to encouraging the civil involvement of the Algerian population. One 
of its classic interventions aims at promoting popular participation in the various electoral 
consultations. Indeed, the final report published by the observation mission sent in 2012 to monitor the 
legislative elections underlined the authorities' lack of commitment to encouraging popular 
participation. It therefore recommended a long-term strategy of civic education.
24
 Between 2011 and 
2012, the annual programs of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights allocated 
1.5 million euros to the country. Most of these funds served to encourage popular participation via the 
mediation of local associations.
25
 As is often the case, the notion of “civil society” was a palliative to 
the state's deficiency. Nevertheless, while criticizing the Algerian authorities, these European 
interventions also echoed the declarations of members of the government who often underscores the 
lack of civic culture of the “people.”26 Each electoral campaign witnesses state officials advocating for 
electoral participation, sometimes even claiming that voting is a religious duty. Here, one can see how 
local agendas intersect with European commitments to democracy promotion and to improving 
popular civic culture. 
Most of the actions taken in favor of human capital remain market oriented. From this perspective, 
raising the environmental awareness of local actors is another form of responsibilization, which 
mirrors the ecological concerns of modern ordoliberal figures who promote the notions of “sustainable 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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development” and “eco-social market economy” (Riegler 2003; Maucher, Malik & Farschtschian 
2012). Ecology has become a way to shape the market and to secure economic results, as the European 
Commission stated in its strategy document for Algeria: 
“Future growth prospects also depend on controlling economic costs and the effects on public 
health of environmental degradation. This degradation has an immediate impact on health, natural 
capital, productivity and the efficient use of resources. The impact of this degradation has been 
conservatively estimated at 5-7 % of GDP.”
27
 
As is often the case, the EU's intervention started by targeting public authorities. Beginning in 1992, 
the EIB has financed the assistance and training of local actors through the METAP (Mediterranean 
Environmental Training and Assistance Program), which was co-financed by the World Bank. In 
Algeria, it intervened in order to “strengthen the local capacity to plan and manage the coastal zone” in 
Tlemcen and to “improve the protection and management of resources” in Blida28. After the signing of 
the Association Agreement, the systematization of twinnings allowed the expansion of these transfers 
of expertise to encourage local authorities to shoulder their responsibilities. For example, the twinning 
program implemented for the National Research Center for the Development of Fishing and Fish 
Farming (CNRDPA) was designed to shape its institutional and legal framework and to “bolster its 
human resources.” The twinning program financed by the EU mobilized 1.1 million euros and relied 
on the expertise of the Italian and French administrations.
29
 Improving public “managerial and 
scientific capacities” of the CNRDPA aimed at influencing the conceptualization of local policies and 
allowing a “responsible management” of the environment.”30. From 2011 to 2013, the cooperation 
program dedicated 34 million euros to the protection of the environment in Algeria.
31
 These projects 
were conceptualized in relationship to “civil society.” In the Mediterranean space, Europeaid financed 
the transnational program REMEE (Rediscovering together the water heritage in the Mediterranean 
region), which aimed notably at “increas(ing) awareness among citizens, particularly youth, of the 
water heritage protection,” via the organization of educational workshops and exhibitions. REMEE 
involved several North-African associations, such as the Algerian AREA-ED (Association de 
Réflexion d'Echanges et d'Action pour l'Environnement et le Développement). This association based 
in Tipaza has about thirty members and belongs to an international network of NGOs working against 
desertification. Its budget over the last decade has been constantly supported by European funding for 
various activities such as providing training programs, raising environmental awareness, and 
organizing youth campus. During the last period (2011-2015), AREA-ED provided trainings to other 
NGOs drawing on its own expertise and was directly associated to the integrated management of the 
coastal zones.
32
 Drawing on its cooperation with the EU, the Algerian NGO has become an integrated 
component of this transnational apparatus of governmentality that brings together local associations, 
nation-states and global institutions (Ferguson & Gupta 2002). 
Responsabilization implies the systematic transfers of expertise to Mediterranean partners in order 
to improve local capabilities. A study from the Directorate-General for External Policies suggested 
that transfers regarding energy efficiency should rely on the involvement of private companies, 
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training institutes and research centers.
33 
The process of responsibilization is at the crossroads of 
government, society and economy. It shapes the actions of local population, public and private 
organizations, and the environment broadly defined. From this point of view, the Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation favors a post-modern fragmented governmentality. At the same time, the ordoliberal 
approach relies primarily on the strengthening of public capacities. Tellingly, the example of AREA-
ED shows how the responsibilization of the citizens results in their association to a top-down process 
directed by the state. 
3. Securitization 
3.1 Securitizing Culture 
A second category of the technologies of power implemented in the Euro-Algerian is comprised of 
technologies of securitization. Securitization – which refers to the framing of issues as security 
concerns to ensure they are prioritized (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998) – is common in the 
neoliberal era. It cannot, therefore, be seen as specifically ordoliberal. From this perspective, the EU is 
a space where transnational agencies manage diverse social, economic and political insecurities. Each 
risk must meet a specific form of power, and each issue is managed in order to ensure minimal safety 
(for the consumer, the investor, the patient...) (Walters & Haahr 2005: 92-106). One of the examples 
that demonstrates how issues are securitized beyond Schengen's limits is the externalization of border 
controls and the criminalization of illegal migration. While certainly relevant regarding the question of 
human capital, the question of immigration will be bracketed in this paper, as it has received extensive 
attention elsewhere (Rodier 2012; Gabrielli 2014). Instead, we will focus on the ways in which the 
Euro-Algerian cooperation answers to certain forms of human risks that have been identified in the 
Algerian context. 
Among the issues related to stability in the South is the question of cultural insecurity and national 
identity (Amar 2013). While linked to the postcolonial configuration -that is to say the legacy of 
colonial acculturation - and the process of globalization, this issue is also informed by the civil war of 
the 1990s in Algeria. Algerian actors often portray the Black Decade as the moment when the polity 
lost itself, and ceased having any political and social cohesion.
34
 After the shock of the violence, the 
debates were especially oriented toward questions of reconciliation and memory. Similarly, the 
“enrichment of the memory of the Algerian society” was one of the goals of the cooperation programs 
for the valorization of patrimony implemented by the EU from 2011to 2013. One of the visible 
consequences of these programs was the funding of a “memory center” in Blida where peoples 
impacted by the civil war could seek help “that they would not or could not get from the government” 
(Mundy 2015: 157) 
The question of culture is also linked to a second category of risk: the intercultural tensions in 
Algeria and in the Mediterranean space.
35
 In the Algerian political discourse, certain Berber 
populations and regions have often been portrayed as a risk for national unity. This was the case in 
Kabylia following the uprising of 2001, and more recently in the region of the Mzab, following a 
series of intercommunal clashes. In response, the regime has at the same time promoted a unique 
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“Algerian culture” and advertised a folkloric diversity.36 As cultural mosaics has been viewed as a risk 
for the unity of postcolonial nations, transnational institutions intervened to propose an enchanted 
vision of cultural diversity as an opportunity for polities during periods of uncertainty. Similarly, in a 
preparatory report on Algeria, the promotion of “cultural and human diversity” was presented as a 
necessary element in the EU's strategy, given the demands of both the government and the 
population.
37
 De facto, cultural diversity appears as a risk for a young polity, though it can also 
represent a chance for human development as long as it is correctly managed and appropriated by local 
actors. 
Concretely, the cooperation report released by the Delegation of the EU in Algeria in 2013 offers a 
complete overview of the different programs -both national and regional- that foster cultural diversity 
and intercultural dialog in Algeria. They rely heavily on training programs, transfers of expertise to 
Algerian institutions and NGOs, in order to facilitate the “appropriation by populations of their own 
cultural patrimony.” The organization of festivals dedicated to “musical dialog” and “reflections on 
identity” illustrates the importance of cultural policies as a way to promote mutual understanding. In 
the Algerian case, this strategy is at least partly a response to the risks of communitarian division and 
the specter of a clash of civilizations.
38
 
3.2 Stability and Social Cohesion 
Broadly stated, security is the dominant lens through which the region is viewed by Europe. After 
2011, the Algerian government promoted the international image of a pole of stability in a troubled 
Arab world. At the same time, this narrative of Algerian stability is contested by local commentators. 
While some express their concerns regarding the manipulations of foreign enemies, others accuse the 
regime of being incapable of effective governance due to its divisions.
39
 Moreover, many observers 
point to the risk posed by social unrest and the lack of dialog between the protesters and public 
authorities.
40 
 
The necessity to ensure social cohesion has been noted repeatedly by European actors since the 
signing of the Association Agreement. In 2007, the strategy document released by the Commission 
underlined the dangers linked to social unrest, especially given the high unemployment rate among the 
youth and women.
41
 The statistics produced by the EU confirm these observations. In 2015, the final 
report of the European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion (ESPON) 
pointed to a series of social risks including the gender gap in education and employment, the 
demographic “time bomb” resulting from higher birth rates in the South, and the pervasive lack of 
social services and education in rural regions.
42
 This report again highlights how social cohesion has 
become a security concern, and how this results in the designation of target populations for policies: 
namely the unemployed, youth and women, especially in southern zones. Indeed, the youth and rural 
populations are also under the scrutiny of the Algerian government and benefit from its timely shows 
of generosity.
43
 Here, we can see how the transnational development apparatus produces client 
                                                     
36
 El Watan, September 19th 2014. 
37
 Helly, D. (2014), “Algeria Country Report,” Preparatory action – Culture in EU External Relations. 
38
 Delegation of the European Union in Algeria, “Rapport sur la coopération UE-Algérie,” Algiers, July 2013. 
39
 In the context of the Presidential election of 2014, see L. Hanoune, the head of the Workers' Party (Ennahar, March 28th 
2014) and former Prime Minister M. Hamrouche (Maghreb Emergent, March 23rd 2014). 
40
 La Tribune, April 17th 2011; Ennahar, April 20th 2013. 
41
 European Commission, “Algérie. Document de stratégie (2007-2013),” Brussels, 2007, 15-16. 
42
 ESPON, “Integrated Territorial Analysis of the Neighbourhoods. Scientific Report – Part II,” March 11th 2015, 452-456. 
43
 For example, by announcing the cancellation of their debts (Ennahar, May 15th 2009) or a massive wave of hirings in the 
public sector (Echourouk, June 22nd 2014). 
Ordoliberalism beyond Borders: The EU and Algeria's Human Capital 
11 
categories that are targeted by various programs in order to integrate them to the market economy 
(Escobar 1995).  
The European use of the notion of “inclusive growth” exemplifies this focus on precarious social 
categories.
44 
Once a specific issue becomes a security concern, it is only a matter of time before 
policies are designed to address the risk that has been posed. On a regional scale, the strategy 
document for the Sahelian space released by the European External Action Service linked human 
development to questions of counter-terrorism. One of the strategic actions listed was to “offer to 
socially marginalized groups, especially the youth prone to radicalization, basic social services and 
economic and employment perspectives.”45 In regard to Algeria, the 2007 strategy document 
suggested improving the business environment and the education system as well as increased 
opportunities for professional training, especially in rural areas, in order to reduce unemployment and 
fight inequalities.
46
 More recently, in a report for the European Training Foundation, an economist 
based in Algiers suggested developing a micro-finance system and involving the private sector in the 
conceptualization of policies, in addition to a reform of public services.
47
 In other words, the 
prevailing wisdom posits that social risks can be minimized through a combination of economic 
modernization and investment in human capital. 
Concretely, several Euro-Algerian programs have addressed the issue of social and economic 
precariousness by reforming the country's labor market. Following a well-established pattern, the 
ordoliberal intervention develops local public capacity to manage populations. One of the first 
programs implemented was directed at the Ministry of Professional Training. From 2003 onwards, it 
drew on private training companies such as the French Demos Group to produce a skilled labor-force 
in accordance with the requirements of international competition. According to the website of the 
Ministry, one of the objectives of this cooperation was to “provide the Algerian population with better 
opportunities for insertion and recycling on the labor market.”48 Similarly, the more recent PASEA 
program offers training programs to the employees of the National Agency for Employment (ANEM), 
to enhance its statistic tools and management capacities. PASEA relies on the participation of the 
German company GOPA Worldwide Consultant as well as agencies of different member states. 
Launched in 2014, this project is part of a broader Euro-Algerian initiative to engage the youth 
population. More broadly, the program expands the reach of the ANEM by increasing the number of 
local agencies.
49
 Finally, the securitization of social precariousness results in a European intervention 
aiming at improving the local labor market and reinforcing the Algerian techno-structure with the help 
of private companies specialized in transnational training. An ordoliberal understanding of socio-
economic equilibrium shapes a changing Algerian governmentality, most notably by enhancing the 
public management of “at-risk” populations in accordance with the market's needs. 
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4. Standardization 
4.1 What Knowledge for the Market? 
The “Spring Program” implemented by the EU in response to the Arab uprisings made “sustainable 
and inclusive growth and economic development” one of its top priorities. It encouraged a larger focus 
on employment policies and the strengthening of labor market institutions in partner countries. At the 
same time, the Spring Program also suggested that the “regulatory framework for business” should be 
reinforced and advocated for the development of a “good quality vocational education and training” 
answering to the labor market needs.
50
 The standardization of skills allows for the commodification of 
the Mediterranean labor-force. It serves to increase the competitiveness and attractiveness of southern 
countries and, to a lesser extent, bolster the adaptability of southern workers to the European market. 
Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to limit market-oriented knowledge to a formal understanding. 
As Elyachar notes, early neoliberal thinkers based their criticism of economic planning on the 
impossibility of meeting economic challenges by relying on an academic or professional education. 
Opposed to any centralized and rational management, they rather promoted a tacit knowledge that 
would allow the individual to act as an independent economic agent (Elyachar 2012). This promotion 
of tacit knowledge is echoed by development programs that insist on the necessity for Mediterranean 
countries to “give an access to critical thinking” to their populations in order to answer to a global 
economic context that requires “energetic, creative and autonomous individuals” (Blanc & Abis 2007: 
36). Similarly, the former Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry developed exchanges 
between North African and European states in order to promote an “entrepreneurial spirit”. In addition 
to technical and financial assistance, European experts suggested that this promotion relies on the 
educational system as much as advertising on TV and on the Internet.
51
 The terms of the Euro-
Mediterranean charter for enterprise leave no doubt regarding the systematic dimension of this 
program: 
“We will nurture entrepreneurial spirit from an earlier age. General knowledge about business, 
entrepreneurial attitudes and entrepreneurship skills need to be taught and developed at all school 
levels. Specific business-related modules should be made an essential ingredient of education 
schemes at secondary schools, colleges and universities.”
52
 
This passage illustrates the tension between two conceptions of knowledge that coexist in neoliberal 
thought: a managerialism based on the responsibilization of an individual who relies on his/her tacit 
knowledge and a more structural approach that draws on a formal and standardized training. Yet, this 
seeming contradiction is resolved by the moral dimension of ordoliberalism, which is translated into 
ethical norms that must be internalized by individual economic agents. Consequently, managerial 
programs can also be coercive for those who must learn the codes of “good” entrepreneurialism (Le 
Goff 1996). Beyond the image of a tacit, autonomous and spontaneous knowledge, there is also a 
formal and ordered relationship to market economy. This cohabitation is already present in Foucault's 
understanding of homo economicus both as an entrepreneur of himself and as a subject in a new 
regime of truth (Foucault 2004b). 
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4.2 Supporting SMEs and Creating Good Businessmen 
Over the last decade, the EU has implemented various programs for the modernization of the Algerian 
economy, such as PME/PMI (supporting small businesses), DIVECO (diversification of the economy) 
or FACICO (facilitating trade). In accordance with the so-called principle of “think small first,” the 
development of SMEs in Algeria was encouraged in order to diversify the economy and decrease the 
country's vulnerability to a potential drop of hydrocarbons prices. The second part of the PME/PMI 
program was launched in 2009. With an approximate budget of 40 million euros, it was the main 
large-scale project in Algeria for the period 2007-2013.
53
 
The primary objective of PME/PMI was to provide technical assistance to Algerian SMEs and to 
foster the mutation of the productive sector toward a more competitive model. In order to respond to a 
series of challenges for local enterprises (modern management, capture of new market, adaptation to 
standards of quality...), the program provided small businesses with direct training. In so doing, 
PME/PMI aimed at improving the practices of the employees and conforming local SMEs to the use of 
quality control. On its website, the program keeps publishing handbooks presenting the expected good 
practices regarding general topics (financial management, communication, hygiene) and more 
technical topics (rules for adding food additives to juices), in collaboration with public institutions 
(ANDPME – National Agency for the Development of SMEs) or industry associations (Algerian 
Association of Beverage Producers).
54
 
This direct intervention offers concrete opportunities for local businessmen who want to upgrade 
their employees' skills and adapt their production methods to the European market. One of the most 
telling examples is surely Slim Othmani, the CEO of the food company NCA Rouiba. In the 
framework of PME/PMI, the company has benefited from training programs for its employees 
regarding hygiene practices to develop its export activities. Eight members of the company have also 
been trained in order to perform internal audits.
55
 The case of NCA Rouiba provides a good example 
of the way in which the EU can provide a formal knowledge that meet the requirements of the global 
market.  
The case of Othmani is interesting for other reasons as well. An unconventional figure in the 
Algerian economic field, he left the FCE in 2014 in order to protest against its endorsement of 
Bouteflika's candidacy. A firm defender of the Association Agreement, the CEO is also an interlocutor 
of the European Union when it comes to the modernization of the Algerian economy. Thus, it is not 
surprising that his company benefited from European programs. In return, he has worked with various 
European institutions, such as the EIB for which he gave a presentation in Luxembourg in 2008, 
dedicated to the challenges of human capital in the South of the Mediterranean.
56
 Moreover, Othmani 
is also the founder of CARE (Cercle d’Action et de Réflexion autour de l’Entreprise), a think tank that 
works with the Delegation of the European Union in Algeria. Since 2014, they have organized a series 
of debates on various issues related to the modernization of the Algerian economy. 
It is especially telling that CARE insists both on its commitment to democracy and to its promotion 
of good corporate governance in Algeria. From this perspective, the question of standardization is not 
limited to commodities but also encompasses a series of “good” social behaviors. As it was once put 
by Wilhelm Röpke, one of the founding figures of ordoliberalism, a wealthy free market economy 
draws on a “stable framework of political, moral and legal standards” (1959: 255). The new subject is 
not merely economic. It is also shaped by the EU's promotion of standards of democratic governance 
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at the sectoral level (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 808). Here again, we find the particularity of 
the EU's ordoliberal approach to human capital, as the moral dimension of this anthropological 
intervention appears. Standardization and responsibilization join to shape the ordoliberal subject, both 
as a model citizen and an entrepreneur who will act for the joint benefit of the polity and the market. 
4.3 The LMD crisis 
Unsurprisingly, attempts at social engineering are accompanied by forms of contestation since the 
adaptation to a free market society is far from being a neutral process. At the end of 2015, during a 
conference organized by CARE, the former Algerian ambassador in Brussels criticized the 
implementation of the Association Agreement. He underlined the inability of Algerian producers to 
meet the requirements of the European market and he denounced the administration's resistance to 
enforce the required norms.
57
 This episode illustrates the opposition to change in local 
governmentality. In Algeria, a combination of local and foreign pressure threatens the traditional 
model of bureaucratic domination and the social categories that depend on the state's redistribution of 
national wealth. Meeting the required globalized standards challenges a protectionist model that 
answers to the needs of the ruling elite as much as to those of the more precarious classes. 
In order to understand that these transformations do not only threaten the position of crony 
capitalists and corrupt bureaucrats, one can look at the reform of the Algerian higher education system 
that was implemented with the support of the EU. In 2007, the European strategy document presented 
governmental reform as a priority in order to “enhance the level of training of human capital.” The 
goals listed were: increasing youth employment, limiting migration, upgrading economic 
competitiveness and proving a more qualified labor force.
58
 In 2010, the PAPS-ESRS (Programme 
d'Appui à la Politique Sectorielle de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique) was 
implemented with funds provided by the Algerian government (17,1 millions EUR) and the EU (21,5 
millions EUR). While the training of referring public managers started, journalists in the business-
oriented press, technocrats from the Ministry of Higher Education, and academics associated with the 
reform echoed the European wish to see the emergence of a business-oriented university.
59
 
This reform implied the standardization and subsequent commodification of formal knowledge. For 
example, the creation of technological platforms that met European standards in three Algerian 
universities aimed at facilitating exchanges with the private sector. On a larger scale, one of the main 
undertakings of the program was the creation of a License – Master – Doctorate (LMD) system similar 
to the structure existing in Europe according to the Bologna Process. The LMD was gradually 
introduced in Algeria since 2004, officially in order to improve the international integration of its 
academic system and the mobility of the students. It has also been criticized as a European experiment 
that would decrease the value of academic diplomas by student unions and nationalist politicians.
60
 
Nevertheless, the process of standardization continued as the EU monitored the reform of the Algerian 
higher education system in 2010, focusing on the enhancement of “the management and development 
of human resources.”61 
Nevertheless, the transformation of the Algerian academic system implied massive organizational 
complications, increased territorial inequalities and introduced a growing confusion regarding the 
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value of different diplomas. Despite a shared desire to improve mobility and gain better access to the 
global system, the material and institutional shortcomings revealed the general discontent in higher 
education (Ghouati 2012). Among academics, there was a sharp divide between those who actively 
participated in the conceptualization and the implementation of the reform, and those who denounced 
the LMD system for being pedagogically inefficient, materially unfit and politically unacceptable 
given the resulting subjection to the European system.
62
 Student strikes and protests started at the end 
of February 2011, with the joint mobilization of specialized elite schools and public universities. 
While denouncing a ministerial decree related to the LMD reform,
63
 this movement also echoed 
growing denunciations of the precariousness of life in campus and the insufficiencies of pedagogical 
means. Moreover, in the context of the recent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, some of the student 
protests briefly incorporated a more radical rhetoric that challenged the entire political order (Baamara 
2012). The LMD crisis demonstrates how standardization processes can fuel popular discontent in a 
highly contentious situation. Far from being understood only as a policy in favor of human 
development and competitiveness, the reform was also portrayed as an unfair and disorganizing 
intervention that favored private companies and foreign interests. 
Conclusion: The Making of an Ordoliberal Borderland? 
In 2015, the EU launched its new program in favor of economic and political reforms in Algeria in 
order to “build new mentalities (and) teach human resources the international norms regarding public 
affairs and institutions.”64 In so doing, it reaffirmed the anthropological nature of its intervention. As 
this paper has shown, the Euro-Algerian cooperation draws on technologies of standardization, 
securitization and responsibilization in order to shape a socially integrated, politically and 
economically moral subject. Adapting to the requirements of the single market is not merely a 
technical or economic undertaking, since the construction of the market itself draws on normative 
claims that are inherently linked to a moral and political order (Mitchell, 2002). In our case, the 
promotion of standards of human rationality, responsibility and capability distinctly echoes the 
ordoliberal conception of an ideal “civil middle-class providing the humus for all things” (Röpke, 
1959: 236). The peculiarity of the EU's intervention lies in this attempt to streamline and moralize the 
dominant mindset in the Algerian society. 
The EU's involvement in the transformation of Algeria's human capital also illustrates the changes 
in local governmentality. The high-modernist tradition in Algeria resulted in the prioritization of the 
improvement of state capability, most notably via trainings provided to public servants. Yet there is a 
discrepancy between this logic and the inherently post-modern practices of the EU. Given the 
widespread rejection of foreign interference and the ruling elite's ability to impose its own agenda, the 
role of local public institutions remains crucial in managing the population. Despite the influence of 
transnational actors, the Algerian case illustrates the persistent relevance of the state and national 
sovereignty (Mann, 2015: 244). At the same time, the nation-state is necessarily involved in 
multiscalar processes and relies on a variety of partners, from transnational organizations such as the 
EU to companies and NGOs. While remaining committed to a centralized governmentality, Algerian 
officials demand external interventions in order to manage their territory and reach precarious 
populations. Consequently, the Euro-Algerian cooperation illustrates a process that sees the joint 
restructuring of economy and state spatiality (Brenner, 2004: 111-112). 
The making of an ordoliberal borderland implies a restructuring that is at once economic, political 
and anthropological. From this perspective, the relationship between the center of the “normative 
                                                     
62
 See the articles of Boumediene Moussa Boudjemaa (Le Quotidien d'Oran, November 28th 2010) or Ahmed Rouadjia 
(Algerie-focus.com, March 8th 2011). 
63
 Executive decree n°10-135, December 13th 2010. 
64
 Le Quotidien d'Oran, April 30th 2015. 
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empire” and its periphery draws on the promotion of ideas as well as concrete practices. Intervening in 
Algeria's human capital is foundational as it impacts students, public servants, employees, 
businessmen. It seeks to systematically transform the ways of behaving and thinking of a whole 
population. It is a deep and potentially contentious undertaking that generates support and produces 
tensions. While the European influence faces resistance both from the core of the state and from 
various social groups opposed to the reforms, it also draws on local elites -in the academy, the 
administration and business circles- who appropriate the “civilizing mission” (Del Sarto, 2016: 227). 
These actors take advantage of the pluralization of the center, that is to say, the growing involvement 
of fractions of the “civil society” in the conceptualization and implementation of policies in order to 
solve the problems that remain unsolved by the state (Donzelot, 1991: 178). In a context of a growing 
economic emergency, the transformation in an ordoliberal borderland remains one of many solutions 
proposed to respond to the challenges faced by the Algerian society. Changing a country's 
governmentality is an open process. The place of the state and the founding principles of the polity are 
at stake, and the population has already demonstrated that the conformation to the needs of the market 
is a project that is far from enjoying unanimous support. 
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